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SCHOOL NOTES
Benjamin, '04, has returned from New
York, where he was in attendance at. the
annual convention of the Delta Chf fraternity. He represented the Dickinson
Chapter and was one of the officers of the
convention.

Knappenberger, of the Middle class,
who recently took the second year examination for admission to the Westmoreland
County Bar has been officially informed
that he has passed. After passing another
examination, and after spending one year
in a law office, he will be eligible for admission.

The following ushers have been selected
for the Commencement exercises: Hillyer,
Lanard and Hubler of the Middle class ;

Barnhart and Henneicke of the Junior
class.
The appearanee of Dively and Spencer
on the diamond again this season has
caused rejoicing among thestudents. Itis
hoped that they will continue playing with
the team for the remainder of the season.

Vera and Houck, of the Middle class,
heard the arguments for and against the
Grady libel bill in Harrisburg on the 21st
before Governor Pennypacker. They went
to Harrisburg for that purpose.
Ed. Spencer, a student at Mercersburg
Academy, was a guest of his brother
Charles of the Middle class, for a week
during the present month.
Mfoot court for the remainder of the
term will begin at 7.15 p. m.
Fleitz and Longbottom were in Harrisburg on the 21st to hear the arguments on
the libel bill before Governor Pennypacker.
They were guests of Deputy Attorney
General F. W. Fleitz.
Students desiring to apply to the examining committee of the Supreme Court
for the examinations to be held on June
23rd, can obtain the necessary blanks from
the Dean. Those desiring to take these
examinations should file their applications
at once, because delay might prevent them
from appearing before the committee In
June.
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HON. W. HARRISON WALKER.
The subject of this sketch is a native of
Clinton county, and was graduated from
the Dickinson Scho61 of Law in 1896. Immediately afterwards he was admitted to
the Cumberland County Bar, but remained
in Carlisle only a few weeks, removing to
Bellefonte, where he associated himself
with David F. Fortney, Esq., one of the
leading members of Centre county, under
the firm name and style of "Fortney &
Walker."
The firm of Fortney & Walker have a
large clientage and lucrative practice.
Mr. Walker is the active member of the
firm, for by close application he has fitted

himself to take the lead in the affairs of
the business.
He was acandidate for burgess of Bellefonte, Pa., at the election this spring on
the'Democratic ticket, of which party he
is a prominent member. When the vote
was counted it was his good fortune to
have a majority of 842, the largest majority
ever given a candidate for that office on
the Democratic ticket, the town always
being strongly Republican.
Mr. Walker is an active member of the
Masonic Fraternity, occupying chairs In
the Blue Lodge and Chapter and at the
present time is'Eminent Comnan'der of
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Constans Commandery No. 33 Knights
Templar. .He is also a member of the
A,. A. S. R. 32' of Williamsport, and of
the Shyiners of Wilkes Barre, as well as
a, member of the order of Elks. For several
years past he has had the honor of being
selected to deliver the annual memorial
address of that organization in various
parts of the state.
NEW LEGAL FRATERNITY
ORGANIZED
Theta Lambda Phi
The movement for the organization of a
new legal fraternity was brought to a
climax February last by the organization
of "Holmes" chapter of the Dickinson
School of Law, Carlisle, Pa.
The chapter was organized with fourteen regular and four honorary members,
among whom are Ex-Judge Sadler of the
9th Judicial District, Ex-Judge Henderson
of the 12th Juoicial District, Prof. G. W.
Swartz, Prof. Jos. McKeehan, A. M.,
LL. B., of the Dickinson School of Law.
Great interest has been taken in this
now movement and by the present outlook several chapters may be organized
before the close of the present school year,
it being the intention of the founders to
make this a general legal fraternity.
Arrangements are under way for the
opening of a chapter house which will be
oc.cupied either the latter part of the school
term or the opening of the coming school
year.

At the present time "Holmes" chapter
is occupying the entire third floor of the
Lins building, Main below Pitt street.
The general secretary's address, P. 0.
Box 383, Carlisle, Pa.

with care, and deals with the rights. and
liabilities of the parties, their capacity
and authority to execute such paper with
comprehensiveness and satisfactoriness.
Starting with the origin of commercial
paper, the authors give it srise and its importancein the commercial world, drawing comparisons between the ancient common law, and the law of to-day. To the
capacity of the parties, and to consideration, the writers devote more discussion
than is usually met with in a work of
this character.
These subjects are as thoroughly and
generally discussed as in many works on
contracts, where, it seems, they properly
belong. Their treatment, however, detracts not from the interest of the work;
on the contrary they render it more interesting, for the discussions ',eal principally
with those subjects so far as they concern
commercial paper. The arrangements of
the citations differ from those in the
average text book.
To ascertain the law of any particular
state as cited in the average book, it is
necessary to carefully examine the foot
notes. In this work this information an
be obtained at a glance, the citations of
each state being arranged, evidently, with
that purpose in view.

MOOT COURT.
SARAH FINK vs. WM. REYBOLD.
Convenant for definite period-Suit by
legatee in her own name for breach of
convenant made by decedent-Lemae an
asset of the estate.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Reybold leased a saw-mill to John Fink
BOOK REVIEW
for 24 years and in the lease covenanted
to supply twenty hora power by water
A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL PAPER AND
from a neighboring dam andcreek. Three
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS OF LAW.years afterwards, Fink died, devising: "all
By James W. Eaton, late lecturer on my estate, real and personal, to my wife."
the Law of Contracts and Negotiable Reybold had stopped supplying the power
Instruments in Albany Law School, and six months prior to Fink's death and conon Evidence in the Boston University tinued to refuse afterwards. Mrs. Fink in
Law School; and Frank B. Gilbert, her own name sues for the breach before
authorof Gilbert on JDomestic _elations. and after the death of her husband. The
This is an interesting work. It discusses will made her executrix and letters testaevery species of negotiable instruments mentary were granted to her a few days
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before bringing this suit, which was two
years after Fink's death.
The damages for the six months prior to
his death, would be $300, and at the same
rate subsequently.
SETZER and SIPES for plaintiff.
Executors and administrators have power to commence and prosecute all personal
actions of decedent. 2 Sup. 111 ;4Bibb Ky.
476. Lease is personal property and descends to executrix. 68 Pa. 75; 57Pa. 493.
When premises are in possession of executor he can sue for a breach in his own
name. Naming himself as executor would
be surplusage. 10 S. & R. 12; 9 Mass.
337; 6 Metcalf (Mass.) 97.
HEDGES and WOLFE for defendant.

When an action is on a contract. with
the decedent, it can be maintained only in
a representative character. Kline v. Guthart, 2 Pa. 490.
Fink had no power to bequeath his right
of action for a violation of the covenant.
Irwin v. Hamilton and wife, 6 S. & R.
207.
Upon death of devisor the suit for violation of covenant, made by him, must be
brought in the name of executor or administrator.
Biddle v. Sheep, 20 C. 0. Rep. 548 ; Nederland Life Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Hall, supra.
A chose in action founded on a contract
or covenant is an asset, and descends to
the administrator or executor. Matthew
on Executors, 9 Law Lib. 144; Raun on
Assets, 245, 478; Wiley's Appeal, 8 W. &
5. 244.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Reybolt leased a saw-mill to John Fink
for 24 years, and in the lease covenanted to
supply twenty horse power water from a
neighboring dam and creek. We are of the
opinion, according to the law, as stated in
136 Pa. 656, that this is a covenant running
with the land. The right to the reasonable
use of the water in its natural flow, without
any diversion of it from its ordinary channel, by any means, is incidental to the ownership of the land through which it flows;
the extent to which it may be used and
applied affects the use and consequent
value of the land, and relates to the enjoyment of it. To the general rule that between convenantor and covenantee there
must be such privity of estate as would
formerly give use to the rule of tenure,
there are in this state, well recognized ex-.
ceptions. The obligations of contracts are
generally limited to the parties making,
them. When privity of contract is dispensed with, there must ordinarily be
privity of estate. But justice sometimes

requires that a right of enjoyment of such
contracts, be given to all that have a beneficial interest in their fulfillment, not to
impose a burden upon an ignorant and innocent third person, but to enable purchasers of land to avail themselves of the
benefit to which they are in justice entitled.
This covenant, after death, passed to the
heirs or assigns, and the right of action
passed to the devisee after his death. In
161 Pa. 623, it is held that an executrix
cannot recover damages in violation of a
covenant between covenantor and defendant, where it appears that the testator had
devised the land to his grandchildren and
that damages accrued after his death.
If plaintiff had brought this action in
her representative capacity, she could have
recovered for the damages accruing before
testator's death. Bringing it in her own
name, she cannot recover, neither damages
arising before his death, nor damages
accruing after death, which she was entitled to as devisee. As said in a New
York case, 12 Johnston 349, also 14 Pa. 352:
"A count on a cause of action arising after
the death of the testator, cannot be joined
with a count on a cause of action arising
in his life time."
The declaration is bad. It would require two differentjudgments. Therefore,
judgment must be for the defendant with
leave to the plaintiff to amend on payment of costs.
LOURImER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

John Fink by his lease, acquired a right
to the supply of water from a neighboring
dam. Six months prior to his death, Reybold had stopped supplying the water.
For this stoppage, Fink had a right of action, which passed, at his death, to his
executrix. The widow, who was devisee
and executrix, could recover for this
breach, only as the latter and not as the
former, or in any other right. The action
should, for this breach, have been brought
in her name as executrix. Not being so
brought, there can be no recovery. 8
Encyc. P1. & Pr. 658; Kline v. Guthart, 2
P. & W. 490 ; McPartland v. Penna. R. R.
Co., 18 W. N. 0. 79.
Reybold continued to be bound by his
contract to furnish the water, notwithbtanding the death of Fink, and despite
this obligation, continued not to furnish
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the water. The contract was a covenant
whose performance was for the benefit of
the estate acquired by the lease, and therefore runs with the lease. Cf. Webb, Extx.
v. Improvement Co., 161 Pa. 623; Lindeman v. Lindsey, 69 Pa. 93 ; Horn v. Miller,
136 Pa. 640.
The lease runs, not merely by assignment
but by bequest, or, under the intestate
law, by the death of the lessee, Fink. As
the action is not in the name of Mrs. Fink,
as executrix, it is unnecessary to decide
whether, although the lease has run from
the lessee, he, or his executrix, could
maintain an action for the lessor's breach
subsequent to his ceasing to be owner.
Webb, Extx. v. Improvement Co., supra,
negatives the possibility of such an action.
The lease is personalty, and therefore an
asset of the estate, which passes to the executrix as such. Wiley's Appeal, 8 W. & S.
244; Taylor, Laudland & T., . 434. The
executrix might, however, assign it to the
legatee or devisee, Giannetti v. Smith, 66
N. J. L. 374, and, as the executrix and
legatee are the same person, and the action is brought by her, not representatively, we might infer that she had, as executrix, transferred the lease to herself as
legatee. But, how soon before the inception of the attion, she formed the intention to regard herself as owner, under the
legacy, we do not know. As the action
can be sustained only for damages accruing before it was begun, the plaintiff cannot recover as legatee for the deprivation
of the water.
Can she recover as executrix without
styling herself such? As executrix, she
held the leasehold as assets, and the breach
is ofacovenant running to her as executrix; i. e. as prese,,t owner of the lease.
The money recovered will be assets. The
principle applies, therefore, that "When
the cause of action, whether in contract or
in tort, accrues after the death of the testator or intestate, and the money, if received, will be assets, the plaintiff may declare in his representative character, or in
his own name, at his option." 8 Encyc.
Pl. & Pr. 658. A being surety for B, and
A's executor being compelled to pay the
creditor, he may in his own name, i. e. not
as representative of A's estate, sue the
princilial debtor. O'Brian v. Coskrey, 4
Y. 105; Of. Stephens v. Cotterell, 99 Pa.

188; State Bank v. Haldeman, 1 P. & W.
161 ; Lea v. Hopkins, 7 Pa. 492; Boggs v.
Bard, 2 R. 102; Kline v. Guthart, 2 P. &
W. 490. The plaintiff could recover, therefore, in this suit, for the damages arising
from the breach of the defendant's contract between Fink's death and the commencement of this action.
It was proper for the learned court below to exclude evidence of the violation of
Reybold's contract prior to Fink's death,
because no damages thence arising could
be recovered in this action. But it was
error to exclude also the evidence of the
post mortem breach and of the damages
springing therefrom, for such damages
could be recovered in an action brought
by the executrix, without her official designation.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
DREAD vs. HARDING.
Beal property-Landlord and tenantEviction-What is meant by occupying
premises-Actionfor rent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Mrs. Rebecca Harding leased a house
from Amos Dread, at $200 per year, for
two years. She agreed not to leave it
without some occupant any time during
the term.
At the end of four months, she found a
position at a distant town and left the
house, with her furniture in it, intending
to hold herself liable for the rent. In
three weeks, Dread, after writing to her
expostulating against the breach of -her
contract, and telling her that if sloe did
not find an occupant, he would set the
furniture out and obtain another occupant.
He found a new tenant, but at a rental of
only $100 per year, and placed him in possession. He stored the furniture in the
garret of the house. He now brings action
against Mrs. Harding for the difference
between $150 and $300, the respective
rentals for eighteen months, and also for
the cost of advertising for a tenant and removing the furniture.
The motive for insisting upon the occupancy of the house was the fear of incendiarism.
McDoNALD

plaintiff.

and

RAUFFENBART

for
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The covenant in the lease, not to leave
the premises during the term, without
some occupant, was a condition for the
breach of which defendant is liable. 18 A.
& E. 0. of L. 369; McKnight v. Krentz,
51 Pa. 237; Vaughn v. Blanchard, 4 Dall.
424; Kerr v. Sharadin, 1 W. N. C. 33;
Collins v. Baumgardner, 52 Pa. 461.

SIPES and

MENGES

for defendant.

An eviction by the lessor is always a defence to an action for rent. Hoeveler v.
Fleming, 91 Pa. 322; Seabrook v. Mover,
88 Pa. 417; Marrow v. Brady, 12 R. 1. 131;
Pier v. Carr, 69 Pa. 326.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The common law rule is well settled
that a breach by the lessee of his covenant,
or agreement in the lease, does not work
a forfeiture of the term in the absence of
an express stipulation in the lease or the
reservatiou of a power of re-entry in case
of such breach. A. & E. E. of L., vol. 18,
p. 869. Tn McKinght v. Kreutz, 51 Pa.
237, there was a stipulation that the
lessee should dig coal-in such a manner as
to do no injury to the surface of the land,
and not spoil the coal itself. The breach
of this, the court said, may subject the
lessee to liability for damages but not a
forfeiture of his estate. Conditions that
work forfeiture are not favorites of the
law, and nothing less than a. clear expression of intention that a provision shall be
such, will make it a condition upon which
the continuance of an estate granted depends. Hand v. Suvarity, 30 W. N. (.
115. The lessor has absolute power, incident to his power of disposition, to provide
for aZ forfeiture of the lease upon certain
contingencies or in case of a breach of the
stipulation in the lease on the part of the
lessee. A rent is given by the way of
reimbursement to the lessor, for the land
demised by him to the tenant, and consequently the lessor's title to the rent is
founded upon this, that the land demised
is enjoyed by the tenant during the term
included in the contract, for the tenant can
make no return of a thing he has not. If,
therefore, the tenant be deprived of the
thing leased, the obligation to pay rent
ceases, because such obligation has its force
only from the consideration which the
enjoyment of the thing demised raises.
Vaughn v. Blanchard, 4 Dal]. 424. If the
landlord claims the use of certain privileges
upon the demised premises against the tenant's consent, he must show a reservation
of these privileges or the rent is suspended.

Magam v. Lambert, 3 Barr 444. If a landlord takes possession of the ruins of his
premises destroyed by fire, for the purpose
of rebuilding, without the consent of his
tenant, it is an eviction and the rent is
suspended. Pier v. Carr, 69 Pa. 326. Although an eviction takes place, the tenant
is liable for the rent due before said eviction. Seabrook v. Moyer, 88 Pa. 419.
If there is eviction from part of the
premises only, and if the tenant continues
in possession of the remaining part, there
is not a suspension of all subsequent
rent. He remains liable to the payment
of such proportion of the rent as the value
of the part retained bears to the whole. On
having been evicted from a part he might
have removed from the residue and thereby wholly relieved himself from the payment of future rent. Failing to do so he becomes liable to a just apportionment.
In the case at bar, as there appears no
express stipulation of the reservation of a
power of re-entry in the case of the breach
of a covenant or agreement on part of the
lessee, the acts of the lessor in removing
her furniture amounted to an eviction,
and while she, the lessee, did not remove
the furniture entirely from the premises,
the court is of opinion she is liable for the
rent of the portion occupied to store her
furniture. The decision of the court, therefore, is that a verdict be directed for plaintiff for the rental value of the garret and
cost bf this uit.
LANARD, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Mrs. Harding agreed not to leave the
house without some occupant, during the
term. That there was good reason for
Dread's exacting this promise, we may
believe. At all events, it was exacted and
it was given. We think the jury might
well have found that Mrs. Harding's
conduct was a breach of her agreement.
But, a covenant is not a condition. In
the absence of words usually employed to
express a condition, such as, on condition
that, the right of re-entry, or of forfeiture
should be explicitly stated. There is an
aversion, on the part of the courts, towards
construing that to be a condition, which
is susceptible of being regarded as a mere
1 Tiffany, Real Prop., 163.
promise.
Dread's lease does not state that It is on
condition that Mrs. Harding did not cease
to occupy, or that, in case of cessation to
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occupy, he, the lessor, may re-enter. If v. Carey, 115 Mass. 560; Tucker v. Mourey,
he deemed the occupancy of the house so 12 Mich. 379.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
important that he was not willing that
Plaintiff and defendant made a trade of
the lessee's rights in it should continue, in
case of non-occupancy, he should have horses on Sunday and Jackson gave Spenclearly expressed his mind. 18 Am. & cer a note for the difference, viz: $45.
When the note fell due, Jackson told
Eng. Encyc. 369.
Spencer that he was sorry that he could
Dread's act, therefore, is an eviction.
not then pay, but that he would pay withThe learned court below has treated it as a
in a week. The week elapsed when he
partial eviction, and, while conceding
that Mrs. Harding might, by' withdraw- repudiated his contract altogether. He
did not offer to return the horse but
ing her furniture, have made it total and
escaped all liability for future rent, has continued to use it. This was a suit on
held that, since she did not withdraw her the note.
The exchange of the horses was clearly
furniture, she continues liable fora portion
of the rent. In this there was error. A an executed contract, but out of this trade
partial eviction by the landlord suspends an executory contract was entered into
the rent in toto whether tenant withdraws ,for the future payment of the difference
from the possession or not. The rent will between the estimated -values of the two
not be apportioned. 18 Am. & Eng. horses, which is evidenced by the note.
This note would have been valid at comEncyc. 298; 1 Tiffany, Real Prop. 130,
mon law which did not prohibit the mak792; Hoeveler v. Fleming, 91 Pa. 322;
Linton v. Hart, 2.5 Pa. 193; Seabrook v. ing of a contract or the giving of a bill on
Moyer, 88 Pa. 417; Reed v. Ward, 22 Pa. Sunday; but by the act of assembly passed
the 22d of April, 1794, it has been declared
150; Tiedeman, Real Prop. 166.
void. The act among other things enacts,
Judgment reversed.
SPENCER vs. JACKSON.
iSunday law-Contracts made on Sunday-Subsequent ratification-Natureof
such contracts.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Plaintiff and defendant made a trade of
horses on Sunday, and Jackson gave
Spencer a note for the difference, viz: $45.
When the note fell due, Jackson told
Spencer that he was sorry that he could
not then pay, but that he would pay within a week. The week elapsed when he
repudiated his contract altogether. He
did not offer to return the horse, but continued to use it. This is a suit on the note.
RiPE and REESER for plaintiff.
A contract made on Sunday, if not void
for any other cause, may be subsequently
ratified. Whitmire v. Montgomery, 165
Pa. 253 ; Cook v. Forker, 193 Pa. 461 ; Cook
v. Dunn, 2 Clark 515; Gallagher v. Gallacher, 5 Watts 200; Bradley v. Rea, 103
Mass. 188; Gwinn v. Simes, 61 Mo. 335.
RENO and SCHWARTZKOPF for defend-

ant.
A contract made on Sunday is illegal
and void and cannot be subsequently ratified. Duncan v. McCullough, 4 S. & R.
482; Milfor v. Water-Co., 124 Pa. 610;
Negley v. Lindsey, 67 Pa. 217; Winchell

that "if any person shall do or perform any
worldly employment or business whatsoever on the Lord's day, commonly called
Sunday, works of necessity and charity
only excepted, etc., and be convicted thereof, every such person, so offending, shall
for every such offence, forfeit and pay four
dollars."
Now it has long been established, and is
now settled beyond all question, that if any
act is forbidden under a penalty, a contract
to do it, is void. Mitchell v. Smith, 1
Binn 118 ; 4 Yeates 84. It is also held in
6 Watts 231, and in 1 S. & R. 477, that a
note given on Sunday is void. However,
contracts made on Sunday are not void in
the sense that they do not admit of ratification, though so long as they are executory, the law will refuse to enforce them
(Cook v. Forker, 193 Pa. 468), and the acts
of ratification will make them new contracts which the parties will be bound to
perform. Chestnut v. Harbaugh, 78 Pa.
473. In Wheeler v. Applegate, 26 Pa.
140, it was held that an agreement made
on Sunday to extend the time of payment
of a note, in consideration of the anticipation of part of the amount, became binding
by the agreed payment on a legal day,
Chief Justice Lewis saying: "It is not the
intention of the law that its regard for the
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Sabbath day shall be made the means of
perpetrating a fraud." So in Whitmire v.
Montgomery, 165 Pa. 253, a note made and
delivered on Sunday was held to be ratified and made good by a subsequent payment.
When the note fell due, Jackson told
Spencer that he could not then pay, but
that he would pay within a week. This
is certainly a ratification of the note in
question. This view is further strengthened by the fact that he did not offer to return the horse but continued to use it. In
53 New York 521, there is reported an action upon a promissory note. Defendant
pleaded his discharge in bankruptcy.
Upon the trial, after proof of the discharge,
plaintiff offered to prove a subsequent
promise of the defendant to pay the noteIt was held that the legal obligation of the
bankrupt is by force of positive law discharged, and the remedy of the creditor
existing at the time the discharge was
granted to recover his debt by suit is barred. But the debt is not paid by the discharge. The moral obligation of the bankrupt to pay remains. It is due in conscience, although discharged in law, and
this moral obligation uniting with a subsequent promise by the bankrupt to pay
the debt, gives a right of action.
We think on this same principle that,
while Jackson would not have been legally
bound by the note alone, there was nevertheless a moral obligation facing him,
which was supported by a subsequent
promise, and, therefore, is binding. In a
case where a vendee kept the land for
which a note was given on Sunday, he
could ratify the note by an express promIse on a week day to pay it, for the moral
obligation was as strong or stronger than
in the case of a note barred by limitations
or discharged by bankruptcy. 56 Me. 100;
40 Miss..341; 5 Gr. (N. J.) 231.
It has been held that a Sunday contract
may be ratified so as to bind, though
where executory, it can only be affirmed by
mutual consent. 31 Iowa 16. In the case
at issue, we feel that Spencer's silence was
his consent, as it was his duty to speak if
he dissented, for the note was due when
Jackson promised to pay within a week.
It is also held that any act done by the
parties on a week day, which recognizes
it as a contract existing between them, is a

ratification. 11 Ala. 885. Therefore, in
consideration of the above facts, with our
interpretation of the law, we render judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
KNAPPENBERGER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The Sunday law of the state forbids the
making of a trade of horses, and the giving
of a note by one of the parties to the other,
on Sunday, and penalizes the act. If, neverlheless, the trade were made, fully performed on both sides, the courts would not
regard the contract as a nullity, and assist
either party to recover what was formerly
his horse. The performance of the contract would as finally vest ownership in
each, of the horse stipulated for, as would
the performaiice of an unobjectionable contract. Shuman v. Shuman, 27 Pa. 90.
Here, the horses have been reciprocally
delivered, but there remains a promise by
Jackson in addition to the delivery of what
was formerly his horse to Spencer, to pay
to Spencer $45.00.
This promise, the
court is asked to enforce. The court will
not enforce it. To do so would be to give
it validity as a promise made on Sunday.
There would be little difference between
the court's coercing partial performance,
and coercing total performance of a contract. Let us suppose that Spencer's
horse, delivered toJackson,was worth $300,
and that Jackson had delivered in exchange a finger-ring worth $1 and a note
for $299. What difference substantially
would there be between the court's compelling the payment of the $299 and its
compelling the payment of a note for
$300, if, instead of exchange and sale, the
contract had been one of sale alone? Nor
will the courts perplex themselves with
ratios. It matters not how small or large
the sum of money, the promise to pay
which is sought to be enforced, In proportion to the amount actually paid by the
same party, or to the value of the thing
which he may have given in exchange,
But for the later promise of Jackson to pay
within a week, no action could be maintained on the note.
Some courts have taken the position
that the Sunday transaction being vdid,
the parties can recover what they may
have parted with, on the footing of it, if
the entire contract on both sides has not
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been performed, and that this is the only
money to be obtained by means of a check,
redress obtainable by the party who has on Cook's banker, which was given by
fully performed. These courts hold that Cook to Forker, on the same day. The
the contract cannot be ratified either by
money was being procured for a corporathe retention of the consideration, or by an tion. On the following Wednesday, the
explicit recognition of the duty and right money was paid on the check to the corcreated by it. Others hold that while the poration. Thecourt below, says Mitchell,
contract can be repudiated by the non-per- J., "properly held that there could be no
forming party, it can also be recognized
recovery on the note," but it so held, on a
by him as valid, and that if it is so recog- motion for judgment for insufficient affinized, it, by that fact, becomes valid. davit of defense, the declaration claiming
Others hold that the recognition does not on the endorsement alone, and showing
make the contract valid, but that it be- no ratification. An amended declaration
comes itself a contract, whose terms are was then filed, claiming, not on the ensimilar to those of the original contract.
dorsement, but on an implied contract,
There are dicta in the decisions of this formoney had and received. This declastate, to the effect that a contract which ration alleged that on Wednesday followis illegal cannot be ratified. Being void,
ing the making of the note and of the ennull, no contract, it cannot be made a con- dorsement, the plaintiff, through his
tract by a so called ratification. In Whit- banker, paid to the order of the defendant,
mire v. Montgomery, 165 Pa. 2.53, it was, the amount of the check. The court behowever, held, that a judgment could be low again refused to give judgment for
recovered on the promissory note itself, if want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.
it wa ratified subsequently to the Sunday
On appeal, Mitchell J., reversing, held that
on which it had been executed. The judg- the Ection for the money could be sudtainment entered on the warrant ,Oattorney
ed, because, though the express contract
was opened. An issue was framed to de- was made on Sunday, its performance on
termine whether it had been delivered on
plaintiff's side by the payment of the
Sunday, and whether it was a forgery. check when prespnted to the bank, did
The court allowed the jury to find a ver- not occur until Wednesday. "But when
dict for the plaintiff on the ground (a) the holder," says the opinion, "presented
that the note was genuine and (b) though and the plaintiff paid it [the check], both
delivered on Sunday, had been afterwards parties ratified and reaffirmed the transratified.
action with all its consequences. This was
Was the Jackson note ratified? In the done on a legal day, and made a legal and
case just referred to, the ratification oc- binding loan of the money." But the accurred by the payment of a year's interest
tion was no longer on the endorsement of
on the note, but the court told the jury the note, and thelanguage just quoted was
that if the defendant had said "I will pay mere dictum, as was the later remark
it [the note] as soon as I can," the plain- "the act of ratification will make them
tiff could collect it. The payment of in- new contracts which parties will be bound
terest in that case, was important only
to perform." The case is really authority
as a recognition of an obligation. The for the principle only that if a check is
jury may well infer from Jackson's state- given on Sunday in exchange for a note,
ment that he "was sorry that he could and the check is presented to the bank
not then pay, but that he would pay with- and paid on a week day, an implied conin a week," a recognition by him of the tract arises to repay the money, because no
obligation to pay the note. Cf.Brewster v. action can be supported on the note; and
Bania, 66 N. J. L. 367.
an action can be maintained on this imCook v. Forker, 193 Pa. 461, alludes ap- plied promise.
provingly to Whitmire v. Montgomery
Judgment affirmed.
as holding that a note made and delivered
on Sunday could be ratified and made
good by a subsequent payment of interest,
but it does not apply the principle. Forker endorsed a note to Cook on Sunday for
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ceive price offered him, which was $400.
"The mere fact that a person contracts
with another whose language he does not
Contract-Sale--Interpreteragentofparty understand, by means of an interpreter,
employing him -Misunderstanding as does not constitute the latter an agent, so
as to bind him by a false translation."
to terms-Innocent party not boundRecovery by replevin.
Denier v. Denier, 5 Wis. 527.
If the interpreter is not an agent of the
STATEM ENT OF THE CASE.
purchaser, neither is he the agent of the
Plaintiff had a horse which he valued at seller. His duty seemed to be to trans$500. Throop, unable to speak Slavonic,
late the language of both parties, as a, midand Smolenski unable to understand Fng- dleman, through whom they may come to
lish, employed X to negotiate for the pur- terms. By this construction the interprechase at $200. X endeavoring to translate ter was not the agent of either party and
honestly, used words which meant $400
thus his representations would not bind
instead of $200, and Smolenski agreed to either party.
the sale. X agreed' to procure Throop's
The cases cited by defensq to show that
note for the amount. The note was actu- plaintiff is estopped from rescinding the
ally for $200 as Throop intended, but it contract, do not apply to the case at hand.
was again represented by X to him to be In those cases the plaintiff was obliged to
for $400, X honestly using the wrong word. know what he was signing or accepting.
Smolenski subsequently learning, that the In failing to do so he was negligent. But,
note is for only $200, brings replevin for in this case plaintiff relied on representathe horse.
tions of interpreter, which he had a perHENEKE and JONES (J. R.) for the
fect right to do.
plaintiff.
Whether the interpreter was an agent
The mere fact of contracting through an of defendant, or an agent of both, or mereinterpreter does not constitute such an ly a middleman or go-between to bring
interpreter an agent. Deiner v. Schley, 5 the parties together, makes no material
Wis. 483.
If the minds of the parties are prevented difference in the decision of the case.
The counsel for defendant contend that
from meeting by a mistake in price, there
is no contract. Werner v. Rawson, 89 Ga. the action should have been brought in
619 ; Horbach v. Gray, 8 Watts 492; Utley the court of equity. True, for the reformv. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29; Allen v. Kir- ation of a contract in case of mutual miswan, 159 Pa. 612; Rodgers v. Olshoppsky,
take, courts of equity have jurisdiction.
110 Pa. 147.
But, was this a case of mutual mistake?
KAUFMTAN (M. S.) and HASSERT for
Did the defendant not pay and receive
the defendant.
Where one party has full and equal op- exactly what he thought he was paying
portunity with the other and no fraud is and receiving? "The chancellor would
practiced, both parties are bound by the have to be satisfied that the mistake was
contract. Am. & Eng. Euc. of Law 20 p. on both sides, for if it be by one party
813. The mistake must be mutual to avoid
the contract. Griffin v. O'Niel, 48 Kan. 817; only, the altered instrument will not express the intention of both. A mistake
Sloan v. Courtnay, 54 S. C. 314; Dubois v.
Dubois City National Bank 176 Pa. 430;
on one side may be a ground for rescindWeller's Appeal. 103 Pa. 594; Chicago, St. ing. a contract, or for refusing to enforce
Paul and M. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Rellwith, 28
its specific execution, but it cannot be a
C. C. A. 358.
ground for altering its terms." Schettiger
OPINION OF THE COURT.
v. Hopple, 3 Grant 57; Wilson v. Getty,
is,
The first question for determination
E. of L., 648.
what is the position occupied by the in- 57 Pa. 266 ; 15 A. & E..
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As the difference in price is so marked, it
is evident that there was no meeting of
minds, and hence no contract. This is
the main and deciding point of the case.
Judgment is therefore entered for plaintiff.
CHAPMAN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

Throop employed Sinkiewicz to negotiate for a purchase from Smoleuski.
Sinkiewicz offered $400 to Smolenski intending however to offer only $200. Smolenski unaware of the difference between
his real and his expressed intention, agreed
to the proposed sale, and consented to take
a note for the price. The note offered
and accepted, was for $200, Sinkiewiez
reading it as for $400. We think it clear
that under such circumstances Smolenski
should not be compelled to abide by the
sale. He misunderstood Throop's intention, and Throop was legally responsible for the misunderstanding. Sinkiewicz's act was his. It is precisely as if
Throop had undertaken himself to address Smolenski in the Polish language,
and had mistakenly employed a Polish
word meaning four, instead of one meaning two. No action could have been sustained by Throop, had Smolenski refused
to deliver the horse for a $200 note.
The horse has in fact been delivered,
and a note for $200 accepted. But, this
note was accepted because of Sinkiewicz's,
that is Throop's misrepresentation, innocent it is true, that the note was for $400.
Smolenski has a right to return the note
and recover the horse. The intentions of
the parties did not correspond. Both had
in mind the same horse, but one had in
mind $200, and the other $400 as its price.
Surely, Smolenski, who properly expressed his intention, should not be compelled to lose $200 for the advantage of
Throop, who improperly and misleadingly
expressed his intention. A grantor can
set aside a deed which without his fault,
conveys more land or other land than he
intended. Clark, Contracts, 291. A grantee
can set one aside, when it conveys less
than, without fault, he understood it to
convey. Johnson's Appeal, 18 W. N. C.
205. A grantor, or vendor, of land or
chattel, can set aside the transfer, when
without his fault, the price agreed by the
vendee to be paid is less than he intend-

The result would not be different,
should we regard Sinkiewicz the agent
of both parties for communication. He,
on that supposition,

informed

Throop

as to Smolenski's asked price, and he
misinformed Smolenski as to Throop's
offered price.
To compel Smolenski to part with his
horse for $200 under the circumstances,
would be a reproach to the law. Had
Throop offered to give an additional sum
of $200, before this replevin -was begun,
perhaps he would have prevented a rescission. As he has not done so, and, as we
must infer, does not desire to keep the
horse, if it is to cost him $400, justice can
be accomplished only by allowing Smolenski to rescind the contract.
Judgment affirmed.
CHARLES McKEE vs. WM. GRIMES.
Sale-Creditinduced by false representations-S ubsequentjudicialsale--ieplevin
by original vendor-B.ights of a bona
fide purchaser-Burden of proof as to
defects in vendor's title.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

McKee sold hardware to Louis Stokes
at three months' credit, Stokes making
representations to induce the sale, which
were known to him to be untrue, and
relying on which, McKee made the sale.
The day after delivery of it to Stokes,
Grimes caused an execution against Stokes
to be levied on it, and three weeks after it
was sold by the sheriff to John Harper,
who three days later sold it to Grimes.
This is replevin by McKee in disaffirmance of the sale. He brings the note taken
for the price into court, and offers to surrender it, on obtaining a verdict.
BARNHART and CAREY for the plain-

tiff.
The burden is upon the vendee to proof
a bonafide purchaser.
HELLER and KAUFMAN (D. E.) for the

defendant.
If the intention was to transfer property
as well as possession, the transaction is a
good sale. Levy v. Conke, 143 Pa. 164;
Cochran v. Stewart, 21 Minn. 435; Shaw v.
Levy, 17 S. & R. 99; Neff v. Landis, 110
Pa. 204.
The original vendee cannot follow the
goods into the hands of a bona fide pur-

156

THR VORUM

chaser. Smith v. Smith, Murphy & Co.,
21 Pa. 367 ; Steinmetz v. Mattock, 4 Leg.
Int. 2:2; Benedict v. Williams, 48 Hun.
(N. Y.) 128.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question to be decided in this case
is whether a purchaser without notice at
a judicial sale of the goods and chattels of
a fraudulent vendee takes a valid title to
the goods fraudulently obtained by said
vendee. We think that McKee's failing
to appear at the sheriff's sale and give
notice of his equities in the goods, in absence of proof to the contrary, left Harper
to purchase the goods without notice of
the fraud. He, therefore, takes a title good
against all the world, and this title he
conveyed to Grimes. If the hardware
which was acquired by the fraud of Stokes
has been transferred into the hands of a
bonafide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, through a judicial
sale, and the judgment debtor was the
fraudulent party himself, the court cannot
give the vendor relief. The defrauded vendor's only remedy is a personal action
against the vendee.
In a case, 97 Pa. 163, it is held that a
purchaser of goods from a fraudulent vendee whose title is voidable on the ground
of fraud, who takes them in payment of
a pre-existing debt against said fraudulent
vendee, is a purchaser bona fide and as
suoh is protected in his purchase against a
claim to the property made by the party
defrauded.
In the case of Rose et. al. Story, it was
held that where there has been an absolute sale of a chattel, and the possession
has been delivered by the vendor to the
vendee, the title passes to him, and it may
be levied upon and sold as his property by
his creditors, whether the price has been
paid by him or not.
A bonafide purchaser of a chattel for a
valuable consideration and without notice
from afraudulent vendee, takes a title clear
of the fraud, whether it be actual or legal.
Sinclair v. Healy, 4 Wright 417; 44 N. Y.
371 ; 21 Wendell 500.
The purchaser for a valuable consideration will not be prejudiced by the fraud of
him from whom he purchased of which
he had no notice. Thomson v. Lee, 3
W. & S. 479; Sinclair v. Healy, 40 Pa. 418;
1 Benjamin on Sales, 870.
In the case of 6tevens v. The Board of

Education, where it appeared that an attorney appropriated money and subsequently transferred it to an innocent third
party for an antecedent debt, it was held
that the defendant having received the
money in good faith, and in the ordinary
course of business for a valuable consideration, he was not liable.
When goods are obtained from their
owner by fraud, it is necessary to inquire
whether the facts show a sale to the party
guilty of the fraud, or a mere delivery of
the goods into his possession induced by
fraudulent devices on his part. If the
owner intended to transfer the property
in the goods, as well as their possession,
the transaction is a sale, and the title
passes, however fraudulent the devise may
have been; but if he intended to part with
nothing more than the bare possession,
is no sale, and no property passes. In the
former case, the contract is not void ab
initio, but voidable at the election of the
vendor. Such voidable contracts may be
affirmed and enforced, or they may be
rescinded by the vendor, at his election,
but in the meantime, and until he-does
elect, if his vendee transfers the goods, in
whole or in part, to an innocent third person for a valuable consideration, the right
of the original vendor will be subordinated
to that of such innocent third person.
Benjamin on Sales, paragraphs 648-649.
The generally accepted doctrine is, that
a bonafide purchaser, for a valuable consideration without notice of fraud, from
one who has frauduleaitly obtained both
possession and property will be protected.
Viewing the facts of the case and finding
that an innocent purchaser of goods for a
valuable consideration without notice,
takes a valid title, we therefore contend
that the plaintiff cannot recover in this
case.
CARLIN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The sale by McKee to Stokes, was induced by the false represpntationsofStokes.
On the discovery of their falseness, McKee
could, while the goods remained Stokes',
have rescinded the contractand by replevin have recovered the possession of them.
But, before he did Ihis, Grimes, a creditor of Stokes, caused an execution to issue, a levy thereunder upon these goods,
and a sale of them to be made. At this
sale, Harper became the purchaser. Had
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Harper become purchaser at a non-judicial
sale, it would have been incumbent upon
him on proof by McKee of the fraud practiced on the latter by Grimes, to prove
that he paid value and had no knowledge
of the fraud. In the absence of such
proof he would have had no better title
than Stokes. Levy v. Cooke, 143 Pa. 607;
Cf. Bank v. Baum, 187 Pa. 48.
If Grimes had became creditor ofStokes,
after the goods had come into the possession of the latter, McKee could not have
rescinded the sale, in the absence of notice
of the fraud to Grimes, before he became
creditor. Schwartz v. McCloskey, 156 Pa.
258. We have no light as to the time of
the origin of Grimes' credit, and we cannot assume that it followed the sale to
Stokes. We shall assume then that McKee could have reclaimed his goods, even
after the levy upon them, in a sheriff's interpleader proceeding, or that by notice to
the sheriff or Grimes, before the sale, he
could have made them liable in trespass
to him, if they proceeded to make the sale.
Mann v. Salzberg, 17 Super. 280.
So far as appears, Harper had no notice
of a defect in the title of Stokes. We do
think that the burden is upon him to show
ignorance of the fraud practiced on McKee by Stokes. The sale was public. Harper was, so far as appears, one of several
competitive bidders. We cannot suspect all the bidders at a sheriff's sale, or in
particular, that one of them, that bid the
highest sum and became the purchaser,
of having known defects in the-title of the
execution defendant. Hence, Harper became the full owner by his purchase.
He has sold it to Grimes. Grimes now
holds it, not as an execution creditor, but
as a purchaser. He takes by substitution
the rights of Harper. It does not appear
that Harper bought at the sheriff's sale
for Grimes. As full owner therefore, he
had a right to be able to sell the article
to Grimes or to anybody. The possibility
that Grimes or anybody else had had
knowledge which would have made it impossible for them safely to buy at the
sheriff's sale, should not be allowed to
hamper Harper's right of sale. We think,
therefore, that Grimes has acquired an
indefeasible title, and that the court below rightly concluded that the plaintiff
could not recover.
Affirmed.
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CUSHFIELD vs. BOROUGH OF
SILVERBROOK.
Board of Health-Power to.destroy property for public safety-Liability of municipalityfor acts of its Boardof Health
-,4cts of June 18, 1895, May 11, 1893.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

During a small-pox siege the board of
health, through its health officers, fumigated a place which was a grocery store
and dwelling combined.
In this house
there had been two cases of the disease and
two deaths. Some of the goods were damaged by this fumigation. The goods were
left in the place and are still in the possession of the owners. There is no ordinance
regulating the fumigating or authorizing
it. The work was not done in a careless
or negligent manner.
CISNEY and GER3ER for the plaintiff.
EBBERT and WATSON for defendant.

A town is not liable for negligence or
misconduct of its health board. The
duties of such bodies are for public benefit
and of purely governmental character.
IHafford v. Bradford, 16 Gray 687; Fishe v.
Boston, 104 Mass. 87; Findley v. Salem,
137 Mass. 171.
Board of Health possesses final jurisdiction in determining the fact of a nuisance.
Kennedy v. Board of Health, 2 Pa. 366.
Other cases cited are as follows: Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. 121i Hand v.
Philadelphia, 8 C. C. 214 ; Elliott v. City
of Philadelphia, 7 Phila. 128; Fox v.
Northern Liberties, 3 W. S. 103; Alcorn v.
Philadelphia, 44 Pa. 348.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

A board of health is a corporate body
created by a statute. The act ofMay llth,
1893, P. L. 44, provides that it shall be the
duty of the presiding officer of every borough to nominate and by and with the
ccusent of the council to appoint the board
of health of such borough, and enumerates
its various powers and duties.
The act of June 18th, 1895, P. L. 203, enlarges the powers of such board, among
them being the duty, "upon the removal
to hospital or other place, or upon the discharge by recovery or death, of any person
or persons, who have suffered from any of
the diseases mentioned in section 4 of this
act, (small-pox being one of the diseases
enumerated), the premises where the disease existed shall be fumigated and disinfected and the bedding, clothing and other
infected articles destroyed, or disinfected,
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at such time and in such manner as may
be authorized and required by the health
authorities. The head of the family or
persons having charge of the premises
shall be responsible for any violation of the
provisions of this section."
The board of health in fumigatink the
building, in the cause under consideration,
were doing their duty as prescribed by the
foregoing act of assembly. It appears that
the work was not done in a careless or
negligent manner. Does a cause of action
arise because some of the goods in the store
were damaged? If there is a cause of
action, the question which the court has
been called upon to decide is whether or
not the borough is liable for the damage
sustained as a result of the fumigation ?
The board of health is invested by
statue with functions of a public nature,
to be exercised for the public benefit, and
in the absence of such remedy, conferred
by statue, are not liable in an action for
tort for damage in the performance of an
official duty. Forbes v. Board of Health,
13 L. R. A. 549.
No such remedy is provided by statute and if the remedy were
provided, we are of the opinion that unless
it would appear that the health officers
acted maliciously, willfully, or with lack
of due care, there could be no recovery.
The board of health not being liable we
find no reason for holding the borough
liable.
It is contended by counsel for the plaintiff that the board of health is a local institution, created by the borough for borough duties only; that it is the agent for
the borough, and hence it should be held
liable for damages. We cannot agree with
this contention. The powers of the board
are of a public nature, and their appointment is devolved on the cities and boroughs by the legislature as a convenient
mode of exercising a public function. The
health officers who fumigated the plaintiff's goods, by virtue of the act of assembly
of May 11th, 1893, have the powers and
authority of a policeman of the borough
for the purpose of executing the orders of
the board. The board and officers are invested with power to investigate and preserve the public health. Their duties are
of a governmental character, in performance of which they represent the sovereign
powers of the state, and the borough is not

liable for their acts or defaults, which
principle of law is laid down in the following cases, viz: White v. Mansfield, 48 Vt.
8; Ogg v. City of Lansing, 35 Iowa 495;
Hartford v. New Bedford, 16 Gray 297;
Norristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. 121;
Hand v. Philadelphia, 7 Phila. 128; Knight
v. Philadelphia, 15 W. N. C. 307.
It is true that this, a taking or destroying of property by authority of the legislature without due compensation, which is
in violation of the provision of the constitution. However, the cause under consideration comes within the well known
exception, viz: the exercise of police power.
When property can be destroyed to prevent the spread of the conflagration, without compensation, surely it can be destroyed to prevent the spread of a loathsome disease; for life, unlike property, has
a measureless value. Judgment for defendant.
B ISHOP, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Goods of the plaintiff were damaged by
the fumigation of his house in which there
had been two fatal eases of small-pox.
Had those who fumigated the house had
no legal authority to do so, they would be
personally responsible for injuries arising
therefrom, notwithstanding the careful
manner in which it was done. The 10th
section of the act of June 18th, 1895, P. L.
203, provides that after recovery or death
of a patient suffering from small-pox or
other disease, the premises where the disease existed shall be fumigated and disinfected, and the bedding, clothing andother
infected articles destroyed or disinfected at
such time and in such manner as may be
authorized and required by the health
authorities. The head of the family is
made responsible for a violation of this requirement. The 19th section empowers the
health authorities to make regulations for
the isolation of the sick and for the destruction, disinfection and fumigation of
bedding, clothing or other infected articles,
and for the disinfection and fumigation of
the premises. So far as appears, the board
of health of the borough of Silverbrook
has complied with this act, making the
needful regulations, and carrying them
out by its officer. It is not suggested that
it could not depute to this officer that ex-
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ecutive function. That officer has done
the work required of him carefully. How
then is he liable? And if he is not liable,
how is the board of health, or the borough?
It does not appear that, the facts being
what they were, the necessary fumigation
could be accomplished without injury to
articles in the store. Perhaps these articles
themselves needed fumigation. Whether
they did or not, and whether if they did
not, they might have been removed from
the store before the fumigation was begun,
the statement of facts compels us to assume that there was no negligence, no
want of care, in the fumigation. We fail
to see, therefore, how any one is liable for
an injury to property incidental to the
doing without negligence of that which
the board of health was authorized and
even required to do.
But let us suppose that the health officer
acted negligently in fumigating the premises, or that the board of health had no
authority even to order any fumigation
at all-a supposition whose truth is precluded by the statement of facts--would
the borough be liable?
The decisions attempt to draw a line of
cleavage between the powers and duties of
municipalities. Some of them are said to
be imposed on them, as agents of the state,
and others for objects in whose effectuation
the state is not interested. Of this first
class, Allen, J., remarked, in Findley v.
City of Salem, 137 Mass. 171, "In all these
cases, the duty is imposed or the authority
conferred for the general benefit. The
motive and object are the same, though in
some instances the legislature determines
finally the necessity or expediency and in
others it leaves the necessity or expediency
to be determined by the towns themselves." How indistinct the criterion of
this classification is, has been more than
once confessed, and becomes apparent from
a comparison of the functions which have
now been assigned to one, and now to the
other. The distinction indeed is not entirely logical or obvious. Briegel v. Philadelphia, 135 Pa. 451 ; Ford v. School Dist.,
121 Pa. 543.
The importance of this classification for
the present discussion, lies in the fact that
for the consequences of the negligent or unauthorized acts of the first class, liability
of the municipality has been denied, while

it is conceded for those of such acts of the
second class.
The liability of a city or borough for defects in streets, sidewalks and bridges
(Decker v. Scranton, 151 Pa. 241; Boroughs, p. 433, et. seq.); and for injury to lot
owners, in consequence of the mode of
constructing culverts, etc., (Elliott v. Oil
City, 129 Pa. 570; Torrey v. Scranton, 133
Pa. 173) has been often enforced; (Contra,
as to bridges, Weightman v. Washington,
1 Black 39). The city is liable for injury
to adjacent property, from a defectively
constructed privy-well on a school house
lot, (Briegel v. Philadelphia, 135 Pa. 451 ;
Sheeter v. Philadelphia, 3 Phila. 228); for
impeding navigation in the Schuylkill
River, by withdrawing water for the supply of its inhabitants, (Philadelphia v. Gilmartin, 71 Pa. 140); for negligent driving
into the plaintiff on a street by a wagon
of the Electrical Bureau of Philadelphia,
from which the city obtains a revenue,
(Bodge v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 492); for
escape ofgas from a gas main into plaintiff's cellar, (Kibele v. Philadelphia, 105
Pa. 41; Ottersbach v. Philadelphia, 161 Pa.
111); for escape of water from a water pipe
into plaintiff's cellar, (Rumsey v. Philadelphia, 171 Pa. 63); for an incorrect certificate as to taxes unpaid, furnished to a purchaser of land by the receiver of taxes.
Philadelphia v. Anderson, 142 Pa. 357.
The liability of a municipality has been
denied, for the negligence of its firemen
in causing a collision between an engine
and a street ear, (Knight v. Philadelphia,
15 W. N. C. 307; S. C. 12W. N. C. 421); or
between a hose carriage and a horse and
wagon, (Rosenberry v. Philadelphia, 7 W.
N. C. 558; Freeman v. Philadelphia, 7 W.
N. C. 45); for the bursting of a hose during
a fire, whereby plaintiff was knocked
down, (Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87 ; Cf.
Hafford v. New Bedford, 16 Gray 297); for
negligently omitting precautions against
fire, whereby plaintiff's house is destroyed,
(Brinkmeyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187); for
the improper arrest of a person by a police
officer, (Elliott v. Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347);
for the improper seizure of plaintiff's house,
for an alleged violation of an ordinance,
(Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. &S. 103 ;
Cf. Buttrick v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 172); for
the negligence of a policeman in not preventing the firing off of a cannon by a

16o

THE FORUM

crowd on a street, (Norristown Borough v.
Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. 121); for a mistake of a
district surveyor, in incorrectly giving a
property owner the boundary lines of his
lot, (Alcorn v. Philadelphia, 44 Pa. 348); for
the negligence of a school house janitor,
in kindling a fire, whereby a scholar is
burnt, (Ford v. Kendall School District,
121 Pa. 543, Cf. Sproat v. Poor Directors,
145 Pa. 598); for negligence in managing
fire-works during a celebration of 4th of
July; Findley v. Salem City, 137 Mass. 171.
The liability of a municipality for acts
committed by its officers or agents, in
reference to health and disease, has been
generally denied. Philadelphia was held
exempt, in Hand v. Philadelphia, 8 Pa.
C. C. 213, although the physician in its
hospital mistook measles for small-pox,
and confined the patient in a small-pox
ward, thus infecting him with the smallpox. Cf. Barbour v. City of Ellsworth,
67 Me. 294; White v. Marchfield, 48 Vt.
2'). A county is not liable for the negligence of its physician in attending to the
broken leg of a poor person. Summers v.
Daviess County, 103 Ind. 262; Sherbourne
v. Yuba County, 21 Calif. 113; City of
In
Richmond v. Long, 17 Gratt. 375.
Mitchell v. Ciky of Rockland, 52 Me. 118,
the health officers having taken plaintiff's vessel as a hospital for small-pox
patients, after the death of the patients,
sent an agent to fumigate it. This he did
so negligently as to set fire to the vessel.
The city was held not liable to the owner.
Though the city, under general law,
chooses the health officers, they do not,
for that reason, become its servants. Cf.
Ogg v. City of Lansing, 35 Ia. 495. In
Lynde v. City of Rockland, 66 Me. 309,
the health committee of a city took possession of a hotel and used it for a small-pox
hospital, without the consent of the owner.
The city was not liable to him although
his loss, alleged to be $30,000, was very
large in fact. Of. Spring v. Hyde Park,
137 Mass. 559, where it is held that the
city was not liable for use and occupation
for six weeks of a dwelling house as a
hospital, because the board of health had,
in excess of their power, taken the property without the owner's consent. Had
they taken it with his consent, the city,
it is said, would be responsible for com pensation, because, without the ability to

bind the city, the board could not perform
its duties. Cf. Boom v. Utica, 2 Barb. 104.
A comparison of the cases classified
supra, will show that there is really no
principle by which they can be separated.
City streets are commonwealth highways;
in making them, it acts for the state. Yet
it is liable for negligence with respect to
them. The school district is not liable for
negligence of an employee whereby a pupil
is killed, because education is a state function, though performed by the locality;
yet for some reason, the locality, which
owns baildingssimply for the performance
of this funcLion, becomes liable to other
property owners if there is negligence in
the maintenance of these buildings. The
supply of water to thirsty people is not,
but the supply of intellectual' food to the
minds of the people is, a state operation.
Preventing or checking the development
of disease in a city is a state work, but
preventing disease or death in a city for
want of water, is a municipal work:
Nor probably is the test found in the circumstance that the state compels or simply
permits the locality to embark on the
work. Findley v. Salem City, 137 Mass.
171. The state might require a city to
open and maintain streets, without exempting them from liabilitk for their defective or dangerous condition. It might
make the maintenance of local schools
optional, without imposing local liability
in case the option should be affirmatively
exercised.
However unsatisfactory the test, we
think that the adoption of sanitary measures for the restriction of disease, and the
cure of the sick, must be attributed to the
city or borough, as an agent of the state,
and not as a principal, and that it is not
liable for any transgression of their powers
by its officers or agents when acting as
health conservators, nor for any unskilfulness or negligence on their part. It follows that the learned court below properly
disposed of the question before it.
Judgment affirmed.
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THOMPSON vs. SAMUELS.

Court, and the sale was confirmed to
Samuels alone. The purchase price, $8,000,
Orphans' Court sale-elease of vendee's
was then paid by Samuels.
interest by parol contract-Statute of
Thompson at no time had other than an
frauds does not apply-Assumpsit for
equitable interest,in this land, and parted
consideration.
with that interest at his own request,
when the court set aside the first confirSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.
mation and confirmed the sale to Samuels
At an Orphans' Court sale of land,
alone.
Thompson and Samuels jointly bid, and
Therefore, this cannot be said to be an
the land was knocked down to them for
action to reeover $500 growing out of the
$8,000. On return of sale it was confirmed.
sale of lands, but to recover $500 growing
Subsequently, Samuels desiring to own the' out of the agreement between Samuels
whole, promised Thompson to pay him
and Thompson, that he, Samuels, would
$500 in addition to his share of the $8,000
pay that sum to Thompson upon his peif he would petition the court to set aside
titioning the Orphans' Court to set aside
the confirmation and confirm the sale to
the confirmation and confirm the sale in
Samuels along. This was done. The $8,000
Samuels alone. Therefore, it is not neceswas paid by Samuels but he refused to pay
sary that the contract between Samuels
the $500. Assumpsit by Thompson.
and Thompson be in writing as required
CHAPmAN and WILCOX for the plain- by the
Statute of Frauds. As we view the
tiffs.
case, even though the contract could be
It is within the discretion of the Orsaid to be within the statute, which we
phans' Court to set aside a sale made by
do not believe it to be, it was so far executed
its own order, and its exerciseis reviewable
only for gross and palpable abuse. Bower's
that it would be unjust and inequitable to
Appeal, 84 Pa. 311 ; William's Estate, 140
allow Samuels to rescind it. To do so,
Pa. 187; Johnson's Appeal, 114 Pa. 132. A
sale may be set aside even after deed de- would be allowing the defendant to set up
the Statute of Frauds itself as an instrulivered. Behring's Estate, 31 Pitts. 156.
The statute of frauds will not be applied
ment of fraud.
to aid the accomplishment of fraud.
We believe that the petition and the
Bowers v. Bowers, 95 Pa. 480; Hazlett v.
presentation by Thompson of the same to
Hazlett, 6 Watts 464; Woods v. Farmer,
the Orphans' Court, is a good and valid
11 Watts 195.
consideration in law to support the agreeVERA and SHowo for the defendant.
The purchaser has an interest from the ment for the payment of the $500. The
moment the property is struck down.
record shows that Thompson carried out
Demmy's Appeal, 43 Pa. 155; Hamilton's
his part of the agreement to the letter, and
Estate, 51 Pa. 311; Brown's Appeal, 68
Samuels, by reason thereof, paid the $8,000
Pa. 53.
The statute of frauds requires the sale of and was given title to the land.
an equitable interest to be in writing.
The oral agreement between Thompson
Gratz v. Gratz, 4 Rawle 411; Meason v.
and Samuels (for there is nothing in the
Kaine, 67 Pa. 126. The essentials to take
statement of facts to show that there wa
the contract out of the statute, delivery of
a written agreement) is not within the
possession, part payment of the purchase
money, and valuable improvements, are statutes, and assumpsit will lie.
not present. Millikin v. Dravo, 61 Pa.
The verdict of the jury must be for the
230 ; Smith v. Patton, 1 S. & R. 80; Rhodes
v. Frick, 6 Watts 318.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
According to the facts in this case,
the agreement between Thompson and
Samuels for the payment of $500 to Thompson was based upon the condition that
Thompson petition the Orphans' Court to
set aside the confirmation of sale of land,
confirmed jointly in Samuels and Thomp.
son, and have the sale confirmed in
Samuels alone.
This Thompson did by
presenting a petition to the Orphans'

plaintiff.

GILLESPIE,

J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

No reason has been suggested, which
would deprive the plaintiff of the right of
action. The promise by Samuels was
properly enforced by assumpsit.
There was a sufficient consideration for
the promise. It was to cause the Orphans'
Court to open the confirmation of the sale
to Thompson and Samuels, to set aside the
return of sale, to allow an amended return,
representing the sale to have been made to
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Samuels, and to confirm the sale to
Samuels, thus reported by the amended
return. These, Thompson has done. He
would be entitled to the $500, were there
nothing more.
But, there is something more. Thompson had an inchoate right to an undivided
half of the land, which, on payment of
the price, would have resulted in a legal
ownership in fee of that half. By the
action of the court, he has lost, and
Samuels has gained this half. The price
at which he was to gain it, was the payment to the administrator of the whole
price bid, and to Thompson of S500.
The statute of frauds will not prevent an
oral relinquishment to the vendor of the
equitable right of the vendee, who has
paid none or only some of the purchase
money. Cf. Brownfield v. Brownfield,
251 Pa. 565. But this is not what Thompson has done. He has released his own
right, in behalf of Samuels, by the petition
to the Orphans' Court, and therefore in
writing. The Statute of Frauds can have

no application.
When the contract, even oral, is executed
by the delivery of a deed, the vendee can
be compelled to pay the purchase money.
The delivery of the deed and its acceptance by the vendee, are an execution of
the oral contract, except so far as the payment of the purchase money is concerned.
Nor is it necessary that possession of the
land should be taken by the vendee, and
that improvements should be made by
him.
While we approve the conclusion
reached by the learned court below, we
cannot but regret the absence of citations
of authorities. The justness of the decision
may be due to a happy fortuity, rather
than to investigation.
Judgment affirmed.
THOMPSON vs. MAGINNIS.
Negligence-Proximateand remote cause
-Contributory negligence-Damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Plaintiff was about to cross a street when
she saw Maginnis driving furiously along
the street, drunk and excited. She became much frightened and hastily turned
around to run back to the side of the
street whence she had started, when she

was run over by a passfng vehicle and
badly hurt. Her hurt entitles her to $500
damages, if defendant is liable at all.
GROSS and CIsNEY for plaintiff.
Defendant's acts were the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury. Chambers v.
Carroll, 199 Pa. 371 ; Vallo v. Express Co.,
147 Pa. 404; Pittsburg v. Grier, 2 Pa. 54.
Where a party, without fault on his part,
is suddenly placed in danger, he is not
bound to use his best judgment to extricate
himself. Stover v. R. R. Co., 195 Pa. 616;
Molene v. R. R. Co., 152 Pa. 390; Cannon
V. Traction Co. 194 Pa. 159.
Fox and KRESS for defendant.
Defendant's acts were not the proximate
cause of plaintiffs injuries. Pass. Ry.Co.
v. Frich, 117 Pa. 397; Mahanoy Towp. v.
Watson. 116 Pa. 344; Hoag v. R. R. Co.,
85 Pa. 344; R. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S.
469; Goshorn v. Smith, 92 Pa. 435.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The facts of this case, in brief, as you
know, are these: Mary Thompson was
about to cross the street when she saw McGinnis driving furiously along the street in
a drunken and excited manner. She became much frightened and hastily turned
around to run back to the side of the street
where she had started from, when she was
run over by a passing vehicle and badly
hurt. Her injury entitles her to $500, if
the defendant is liable at all.
It has been moved by the attorneys on
both sides that the Court give binding instructions in their respective favors. In
consideration of this point the Court
charges as follows:
The right to recover damages for injuries
sustained in this case rests upon the alleged
wrongful and negligent acts of the defendant; therefore, the question is, was the defendant the direct and proximate cause of
the injuries? In determining this the
maxim, "Causa proxima non remota
spectatur," is applied; this literally means,
"the direct and not the remote cause is
considered."7
In many cases important questions
arise as to which, in the chain of facts
tending to the production of a certain
state of things, is to be considered the responsible cause. It is not merely the
distance of place or of causation that
renders a cause remote. The cause nearest
in the order of causation, without any
efficient concurring cause to produce the
result, may be considered the direct cause.
In the course of decisions of cases in which
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it is necessary to determine which of
several is so far responsible for the happening of the act or injury complained of,
what is known as the doctrine of proximate cause, is constantly resorted to in
order to ascertain whether the act, omission or negligence of the person whom is
sought to hold liable, was in law and in
fact responsible for the result which is the
foundation of the action. Hence, we have
but to infer that the proximate cause, in a
case of this nature, is that which led to or
might naturally be expected to produce
the result.
The right of a foot passenger, commonly
known as a pedestrian, to use the crossings
of public highways, cannot be withheld or
denied. Law is so extensive on this point
and the fact so broadly known that the
court deems it unnecessary to render a
scintilla of authority.
In all the properly governed communities, street traffic is regulated to guard the
crossings a far as the conditions of congested travel will permit, and so far as the
respective rights of pedestrians and of the
drivers of vehicles are concerned, the convenience of vehicles must yield to the
safety and convenience of the public on
the crossings. This is generally provided
for by the local laws of the communities.
There must be breaks in the line of
traffic to permit the passage of pedestrians
with safety. The court admits that the
facts do not show that upon the street in
question there was av extensive traffic, but
merely states the doctrine to show a path
for a point which it will bring up later.
The speed of vehicles on the streets is
limited and in many elaborate ways the
right of the pedestrianism to exist and to
be saved harmless from the perils of the
street are conserved. Likewise, this is also
governed by local laws.
Where a person is put in peril, and in
an instinct effort to escape therefrom, falls
upon another peril, it was held by the
court in Vallo v. The Express Co., 147 Pa.
404, "Immaterial whether he might or
ought to have seen or avoided the latter."
Therefore, in this case, according to the
weight of authority, while the defendant
was not the actual cause of the injury, yet
he was the direct cause, perhaps.
Concerning the question of contributory
negligence, which the attorneys discussed

lightly, it has been held in Pennsylvania,
that the natural instinct which leads men
in their sober senses to avoid Injury and
preserve life is an element of evidence, as
was set forth by the court in the case of
Allen v. Willard, 59 Pa. 347.
The traveler on the highway is bound
to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to
avoid injury by coming in contact with
vehicles or other pedestrians, and such a
traveler on foot is in some cases not bound
to look back nor to stop, look and listen
for coming vehicles, nor make sure that
vehicles are not approaching. He is, however, expected to take note of that which
the eye can plainly see. This view was
taken by the courts in four (4) leading
Pennsylvania cases. Lockhart v. Lightenthaler, 46 Pa. 151; Chesney v. Unity, 164
Pa. 358; Douglass v. The Monougahela
Water Co., 172 Pa. 435; and Stover v. Penna.
R. R. Co., 195 Pa. 616.
The above theory cannot be strictly laid
down, however, as solid Pennsylvania law,
because in Carroll v. Penna. R. R. Co., 12
W. N. C. 348, the court held that the
plaintiff was guilty of gross negligence,
even though she stopped, and listened,
and heard or saw nothing of a dangerous
nature; because she should have seen the
train when it was so near, owing to the
fact that it is such a large body. Also in
Magee v. The Traction Co., the Supreme
Court of Michigan held that a pedestrian
must stop, look and listen before attempting to cross the tracks of any railway.
In view of what has been said above, it
would seem that the first question to dispose of, is whether or not the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence. The
test of contributory negligence, or want of
due care, is not found in the failure to
exercise the best judgment or to use the
wisest precaution, but allowance must be
made for the influence ordinarily governing human action, as what would under
some circumstances be want of reasonable
care, would not be such under others.
But the rule that when danger has come
suddenly upon a person and he is called
upon to act instantly and without time to
reflect, it is not negligence to make a mistake, does not apply where the party is
placed in imminent peril by his own fault.
Kilpatrick v. Penna. R. R. Co., 140 Pa.
502.
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Obviously the case turns upon the point
"where was the plaintiff when she first
saw or might have seen (if she used her
sense of vision) the defendant driving in
the manner that the facts indicated ?"
The facts set forth that the plaintiffwas
about to cross the street when she saw the
defendant driving furiously along the
street in a drunken and excited manner,
then in the next breatk, as if it were, she
became muchfrightenedand hastily turned
around to run back to the side of the street
where she started. Now these two chains
of facts apparently contradict each other,
but still the court sees no way but to take
the view that when the plaintiff first saw
the defendant she must have been already
in the street and that the words "about
to cross," do not mean that she was on
the sidewalk and about to step into the
street, but that she had already done that,
and was not by any means yet across.
Again, the defendant must have been
quite near the plaintiff at the time, or else
she could not have formed the deliberate
judgment that he was "evidently drunk
and excited." Then again, a person using
ordinary prudence, would, upon seeing a
drunken man driving in such a manner,
refrain from walking in such a place which
he was liable to pass over, and would
wait ata safe place 'till he had passed. It
was held in a recent Pennsylvania case, to
be the duty of everybody before crossing
the street, to take notice of what was
coming, and after seeing something that
may lead to danger, they take chances
and are injured, they cannot recover.
Of course, these facts do not show that the
plaintiff placed herself in such circumstances or that she looked before entering
the street.
There is no doubt that If the plaintiff
was committed to the crossing when the
defendant came upon the scene, she had
the right of way and if under such circumstances the defendant did not deport himself as he should have done, and a prudent
man would have done, he must answer
for having placed her in peril.
In regard to peril, the place to look for
danger for ordinary vehicles, is at the curb,
before crossing the street. Hence, If the
defendant was In plain view when the
plaintiff started to cross the street and the
plaintiff might, by the exercise oflordinary

prudence and the use of her senses, have
seen him driving in the manner stated,
and avoided the accident, but did not, then
she placed herself In peril and the case
would undoubtedly come under the rule
of Carroll v. Penna. R. R. Co., supra. If,
however, in the exercise of reasonable
care, she could not have seen the defendant approaching because of his not having
been in plain view, contributory negligence cannot be imputed to her.
If she saw him and thought that she
had time to cross, the question becomes
one of fact, and the plaintiff's nearness to
her at the time she saw him should be
considered in applying the usual tests as to
whether her conduct was such as the ordinary, reasonable, prudent person would
have applied under the same circumstances.
If the conduct of the plaintiff was such
that contributory negligence may not be
imputed to her, or if it was such that
would have controlled an ordinary prudent
person, it must follow that the defendant's
conduct was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury, and under such circumstances she should be entitled to a recovery.
As to the point on the injury taking
place by the vehicle of a third party, the
oourt briefly states that where one sustains
injury from the separate negligence of
two persons, he may maintain an action
against both or either of them. Thispoint
is not at issue with the facts at bar, although it may be well to say that it has
been decided by many courts of this Commonwealth, and as mere reference the
court cites you: 46 Pa. 151, 117 Pa. 356,
122 Pa. 288, and 122 Pa. 661. Hence, In
view of this statement of the law, even if
the second vehicle may have been negligently managed, such circumstances will
not preclude a recovery against the defendant if you find him at all guilty of the
proximate cause of the injury in this case.
Now, gentlemen, you have been instructed as to the law on all the points
that may arise in this ease (to the court's
knowledge), and of course you must find
according to your own judgment; therefore, if you find that the defendant was
the proximate cause of the injury and that
the plaintiff did not contribute to it by
any negligence on her own part, then you
must flihd for the plaintiff, but if contribu-
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tory negligence exists on her part then you
will be expected to find for the defendant.
However, from the court's point of view
upon the ease and after careful consideration of the law of negligence of this State
(which is, it seems, just what the court
cares to have it in the particular case), it
asks you to find for the plaintiff.
KEELOR, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The defendant was "driving furiously"
along the street, being drunk and excited.
It would not be at all difficqlt for the jury
to find In this act, negligence on his part.
The plaintiff, in the act of crossing the
street and between the curbs, when she
saw McGinnis, became frightened. To be
there was not negligent. She could not
be blamed for being frightened. Whether
it was careless for her to retreat rather
than to advance, and whether, retreating,
it was careless for her not to see, and to suffer
herself to be run Into by a passing vehicle,
were questions which the jury has not
unreasonably decided negatively,
The only matter that needs consideration, is whether this injury is a consequence for which McGinnis can be made
accountable. Had Mrs. Thompson not
been frightened, she would probably not
have turned back. Had she not turned
back, she would not have been run over
by the vehicle by which she was run over.
Her fear was the cause of the act of retreating. While there are cases that hold that
fear is not a ground for damages, we know
of no case which holds that physical damages, though occasioned by movements of
the body, for which fear was the motive,
would not be a ground of compensation.
Injuries to cows, horses, sheep, may be
thus caused. So may injuries to human
beings. Stokes v. Salbonstall, 13 Pet. 181 ;
Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark 402; Tuttle v,
Atlantic City R. R. Co., 66 N. J. L. 827;
Penna. R. R. v. Werner, 89 Pa. 59. "'If
one is placed by the negligence of another
in such a position, that he is compelled to
choose instantly, in the face of grave and
apparent peril, between two hazards, and
he makes such a choice as a person of
ordinary prudence, placed In such a,
position, might make, the fact that, if he
had chosen the other hazard, he would
have escaped injury, is of no importance.
Even if, In bewilderment, he runs directly
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into the very danger which he fears, he is
not in fault. The confusion of mind,
caused by such negligence, Is part of the
injury inflicted by the negligent person,
and he must bear its consequences." 1
Shear. & Red., Negligence 132.
Judgment affirmed.
THOMAS HOGDSON'S ESTATE.
Wills, construction of-Lapsed devisesDeath of legatees-Act of Afoil 8, 1898,
1 P & 1. 145o, applied and explained.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Hogdson devsed:-"all my estate, real
and personal, to such of my present children as shall survive me, equally as tenants in common." At the timeof writing
the will, he had four children. Afterwards,
tWo others were born. Before his death,
two of the four children died, each leaving
two children to survive him and the teStator. The other two children claim the
estate to the exclusion of the children of
the deceased children, and of the two
children of testator, born after the writing
of the will.
PHILLIPS and COOPER for plaintiff.

Where a testator names as personts who
are to take, his present children who survive him, after-born children are excluded
as well as children of a deceased child.
Gross's Estate, 10 Pa. 360; Geutler's Estate, 4 W. N. C. 504; Hunt's Estate, 183
Pa. 17; Hubler's Appeal, SO Pa. 347; C01tin's Appeal, 88 Pa. 475.
MowRY and CLAYCOMB for defendant,
The act of April 8, 1838, Pard. L. 1450 t
provides that as to after-born children, the
testator died intestate. Willard's Estate,
68 Pa. 327; Robem v. Marlatt 136 Ps. $5;
Grosvenor's Appeal, 81 Pa 404; Edward's
Appeal, 47 Pa. 144; Costes v. Hughes, 3
Binney 498.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Hogdson devised :--"all my estate, real
and personal, to such of my present children as shall sutvive me, equally as tenants
in common." At the time of writing the
will, he had four children. Afterwards,
two others were born. Before his death,
two of the four children died, each leaving
two children to survivb him and the teu'
tater. The other two children claim the
estate to the exclusion of the children of
the deceased children, and of the two
children of the testator, born after tho
writing of the will.
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We will deal with the question as regards the two children of testator born
after the writing of the will, first. The
statute of Feb. 4, 1748, provided "that
where any person shall, at any time hereafter, make his last will and testament,
and afterwards marry, or have a child or
children, not named in any such will, and
die, although such child or children be
born after the death of their father, every
such person, so far as shall regard the wife
after married, or the child or children
after born, shall be deemed and construed
to die intestate; and such a wife, child or
children shall be entitled to like purparts,
shares and dividends of the estate, real
and personal, of the deceased, as if he had
The
actually died without any will."
subsequent statutes of March 23, 1764,
April 19, 1794, and April 8, 1883, contain
practically the same substance, with the
exception, that in the place of the words
"not named in any such will," the words
"not provided for in such will," are substituted. The evident intent and purpose
of these several statutes was to provide for
the maintenance of women married after
the execution of their husbands' wills and
by them unprovided for, as well as children born after the will and "not provided
for in such will."
It is plain, that as to children provided
for in wills of their fathers, there would
be no revocation. No matter how plain
the testator's intention may appear, to
leave his after-born child unprovided for,
in his will, the courts will revoke such
wills as to them, pro tanto, and they will
take such estates as would have passed
to them, had the testator died intestate.
In 34 Pa. 483, Walker v. Hall, the court
said, in discussing the act of 1883, "By our
act of assembly, marriage revokes the will
as to the widow, pro tanto, and so also
does the birth of a child, if not provided
for in such will." These words are clearly
used in the same sense as they are in the
case of Kembel v. Scrafton. Now this is
a positive statutory enactment which can
neither be repelled by parol testimony,
outside of the will, nor by any language
used in the will, raising a presumption
that he did not intend to provide for such
after-born child." In the case just cited,
a testator devised his whole estate to his
wife, providing as follows: "having the

utmost confidence in her integrity and
believing that should a child be born to
us, she will do her utmost to rear it, to the
honor and glory of its parents." The
court held that this was not such a provision for an after-born child as would prevent arevocation. In Edwards Appeal, 47
Pa. 144, the testator, a single man when he
made his will, devised his estate, real and
personal, in trust for the benefit of his
friend, Sarah Devitt and the heirs of her
body. He afterwards married Miss Devitt
and when he died, left her enceinte.
Shortly after, a son was born. The court
remarked: "Upon this state of facts, it is
safe and easy to say that the marriage revoked the will as to Mrs. Edwards. The
revocation as to her, did not depend on
the provision made for her. It resulted
absolutely as a legal consequence of the
marriage. The statute annexes the condition of provision to the children, not to
the widow. As to a child or children not
provided for in such will, it is revoked;
but as to children who are provided for, it
is not revoked by the marriage of the testator and birth of issue."
The counsel for plaintiff have offered
the point, that "all technical rules of construction must yield to the expressed intention of the testator, if such intent be
lawful," and he authorizes this remark
under Reck's Appeal, 78 Pa. 432. While
we do not doubt this as being good law in
most cases, still we are constrained to say
that in the case at bar, that point is without effect, nor is it reconcilable with the
act of 1883; for as we have attempted to
show, the intention of the testator to leave
after-born children unprovided for, may
be indubitable and clear, but the act circumvents that intention and does not per.
mit it to be carried into effect.
We think we have sufficiently covered
the question as regards the testator's own
children, born after the making of the
will and we will now endeavor to dispose
of the second question; whether or not
the grandchildren should receive part of
the estate. The statutes which have been
cited, make no mention of grandchildren
whatever, and if they are brought within
the scope of the several acts, it can only
be done by virtue of the construction put
upon these statutes by the courts. In
Hunt's Estate, 133 Pa. 270, Justice Green
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said: "The word children does not ordinarily and properly speaking, comprehend
grandchildren, or issue generally. Their
being included in that term is only permitted in two cases, viz: from necessity,
which occurs when the will would remain
inoperative unless the sense of the word
children were extended beyond its natural
import, and where the testator has clearly
shown, by other words that he did not intend to use the term children in the proper
actual meaning, but in a more extensive
sense.'? The testator in the case at bar,
said nothing about grandchildren, nor
does the case come In under the two rules
laid down by Justice Green. In Barnitz's
Appeal, 5 Pa. 264, the court said: "It is indisputable that the word "children" used
in a will does not, properly speaking, comprehend grandchildren and, therefore, unless there be something to show a contrary intent, grandchildren will not be
permitted to come in under a devise or bequest to children." In this case the only
grandchildren with which we have to
deal, are the four grandchildren born before the testator's death but after the
making of his will. If these could claim
an interest at all, they would have to
claim as children, and on the same footing
as the two who were born subsequent to
the will, i. e. by virtue of a revocation of
the will, as to them, pro tanto, under the
act of 1883. The court feels justified in
saying that inasmuch as the cases hold
that the word children in its natural sense
does not mean grandchildren, that when
the legislators who framed the act of 1883,
used the word children, they did not mean
grandchildren.
It is, therefore, ordered and decreed that
the will is revoked as to the testator's own
two children who were born after his will
was made, and that they take such interests in the testator's estate, real and
personal, as they would have received had
he died intestate.
BOUTON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The gift is of "all my estate, real and
personal, to such of my present children
as shall survive me, equally as tenants in
common." Two of the four "present children" died between the writing of the
will and the testator's death, each leaving
children to survive him. Does the 12th
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section of the act of April 8th, 1833, 1 P.
& L. 1447, which provides against lapse
on account of the death of a legatee prior
to the testator, pass any share of the estate
to the grandchildren?
This act operates only upon the death
of the legatee. Who then was the legatee?
The gift was not to the four present children, but to "such" of them as should survive the testator. The legatee is not ascertained till the testator's death. The death
before that, of a child, proves that such
child was not a legatee. Hence, there could
be no lapse of any legacy to him. Hence,
his children do not take, in substitution of
him. Bacon's Estate, 6 Philadelphia, 335.
The grandchildren are not legatees, for the
gift is to present children who survive.
They do not take therefore as legatees, or
as statutory substitutes for legatees. They
do not take at all. It follows that the two
"present children" that survive, take all
the estate, unless the birth of two children
later, prevents.
Ordinarily a testator may give his estate
to whom he will. He may disinherit all
his children living, when he makes the
will. The 15th section of the act of April
8th, 1833, 1 P. & L. 1450, however, enacts
that if subsequently to making a will, a
child "not provided for in such will," be
born, the testator shall be deemed, as to
such child, to die intestate. The learned
court below has clearly shown that this
result follows, however distinctly the testator has shown his purpose to give them
nothing. A testamentary purpose as to as
yet unborn children, unless it clothe itself
in a provision for them, is not to be respected. The subsequently born children
take what they would have taken had
there been no will. How much is that?
There are four children now alive, and
four grandchildren, two of whom represent
one deceased child, and two another deceased child. The estate must therefore
be divided into six shares, and each of the
two subsequently born children will take
one-sixth.
The other four-sixths pass equally to the
two children who were alive when the
will was written. The grandchildren take
nothing.
Appeal dismissed.

